Our statements do not exist in isolation, but are tied to an entire web of beliefs—some very abstract and remote from any experience. There is speculation on the mechanism whereby objects of one sort or another come to be posited, a process in which the notion of identity plays an important part.These are, roughly, the two things that can happen when we face a novel experience: we can somehow assimilate it into our old beliefs, or we can reconfigure our whole web of beliefs to accommodate this new information. At the same time adjacent portions of philosophy and logic are discussed. Using the rigorous tools of formal logic, Quine expresses himself in a fine, if spare, prose style. I will leave these desert landscapes of logic for ones more verdant. Quine thinks the world is fundamentally matter; thus, he rejects the existence of spirits, and, more surprisingly, of minds—at least minds as distinctly different metaphysical objects. If this gigantic trash island were to hit something—let us say, a big boat—two things could happen. He returned to a teaching career at Harvard University, from which he retired in Buy Used This is an ex-library book and The logical positivists thought that individual statements could be accepted or rejected based on our experiences. What Quine is saying is that there are no beliefs of ours that cannot be revised—nothing is sacred. The boat could be destroyed, and its wreckage simply added onto the floating trash island; or, the boat could tear its way through the trash island, changing its shape dramatically. A traveling fellowship took Quine to the universities of Warsaw and Vienna, then great European centers for logic, and included work with Rudolph Carnap at the University of Prague.
This also prompts Quine to reject other, more banal, sorts of things like meanings and properties. In analyzing language, he finds defects in the epistemological underpinnings of logical positivism. To the existence of what objects may a given scientific theory be said to be committed?
These are among the questions dealt with in this book, particular attention being devoted to the role of abstract entities in mathematics. I might easily be wrong. The logical positivists thought that individual statements could be accepted or rejected based on our experiences.
At the same time adjacent portions of philosophy and logic are discussed. A traveling fellowship took Quine to the universities of Warsaw and Vienna, then great European centers for logic, and included work with Rudolph Carnap at the University of Prague.
Here is a concrete example. One is the problem of meaning, particularly as involved in the notion of an analytic statement.